Incorporating family decisions in a two-period.model of the world economy, we show that trade liberalization will raise the skill premium in developing countries where the initial share of skilled workers in the adult workforce is large enough (compared with other developing countries but not with developed ones) to attract production activities, previously carried out in the latter, more skill-intensive than those previously carried out in the former. In these countries, the child labour rate will de…nitelly fall. Elsewhere, trade liberalization will reduce the skill premium, but child labour may still fall because income will rise. The empirical analysis con…rms these predictions. Indeed it shows that liberalization reduces child labour everywhere. Where child labour is concerned, liberalization is thus bene…cial everywhere, but it induces developing countries that started out with relatively less (more) educated worforce to specialize more (less) in low-skill production activities than they did before.
Introduction
Since the middle of the last century, the world economy has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of international trade. In more recent decades, this has been accompanied by a reduction in the incidence of child labour. Is there a nexus between these phenomena? Email: cigno@uni….it y Email: giorgia.giovannetti@uni….it z Email: lsabani@uni….it 1 A stream of economic literature views child labour as a direct consequence of extreme poverty. According to this line of reasoning, if parental income is su¢ cient to keep the entire family above subsistence level, children will not work. If it falls below that level, however, all the children in the family will be made to work. For an overview of the theory, see Basu and Van (1998) . For empirical work along these lines, see Edmonds (2005) , and Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) . Another stream of economic literature views child labour as the outcome of parental optimization. According to this other line of reasoning, decisions concerning the allocation of a child's time rest on a comparison of the immediate bene…ts of child labour with the expected future bene…ts of education (see Cigno and Rosati 2003, 2005) . The two approaches are not irreconcilable. If parents cannot borrow, current expenditure cannot exceed current income. In families where this constraint is binding, children will then work even if the expected return to education is higher than the return to labour. Without credit market imperfections, therefore, the allocation of the children's time between work and study would thus be the outcome of a portfolio decision, independent of parental income. With market imperfections, the decision is subject to a liquidity constraint (see Ranjan 2001 , Dehejia and Gatti 2005 , and Beegle et al. 2006 . For families close to the breadline, the allocation will then depend essentially on parental income. As we move up the income scale, however, we may expect the link between child labour and parental income to become progressively weaker and eventually disappear. How does trade and o¤shoring come into the picture?
The opportunity to trade and invest across national borders enlarges the opportunity set and raises per-capita GDP. Other things being equal, liberalization may thus be expected to relax the liquidity constraints facing families with children, and bring about a reduction in child labour. Other things are not equal, however, because international trade and investment may alter relative wages. Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that, if a country opens itself up to trade, it will specialize further in the production of the goods that make more intensive use of its comparatively more abundant untradable factor. If the untradable factors are capital and labour as in the standard North-South model, liberalization will then induce the labour-abundant South to specialize further in the production of labour-intensive goods, and the capital-abundant North to specialize further in that of capital-intensive goods. The wage rate will consequently rise in the South and fall in the North (Stolper-Samuelson theorem) . If the untradable factors are skilled (more educated) and unskilled (less educated) labour as in Wood (1994) , liberalization will induce the skill-abundant North to specialize further in the production of goods with a high skill content, and the skill-poor South to specialize further in the production of goods with a low skill content. With liberalization, therefore, the skilled wage rate will rise relative to the unskilled wage rate in the North, and fall in the South. This prediction does not appear to be borne out by the facts however. Empirical research shows that, in the 1980s and 1990s, increased openness was associated with a rise in the skilled-to-unskilled wage ratio (the "skill premium") not only in the North, but also in parts of the South, notably in middle-income Latin America (see Freeman and Oostendorp 2001 , Feenstra and Hanson 1996 , Robbins 1996 , Wood 1997 and also in some low-income countries (see UNCTAD 1997).
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A limitation of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework is that it only envisages trade in …nal goods. In recent decades, however, there has been a very sharp increase in the volume of trade in intermediate goods, and in the relocation of the factories producing such goods from developed to developing countries ("o¤shoring"). As pointed out by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , and Zhu and Tre ‡er (2005) , if the productive activities so relocated were more skill-intensive than those originally carried out in the destination country, this will have caused the demand for skilled labour to shift upwards, and thus put upwards pressure on that country's skill premium. Depending on whether this or the StolperSamuelson-Wood e¤ect prevailed, the skill premium could have thus risen or fallen. Conversely, if the relocated activities were less skill-intensive than those originally carried out in the destination country, this would have reinforced the Stolper-Samuelson-Wood e¤ect, and the skill premium would have de…nitely fallen. Child labour could have fallen in either case, because liberalization could have raised the income and thus relaxed the liquidity constraint of the average family, but more likely if the skill premium and thus the incentive for parents to invest in their children's education has risen.
In Section 2 below, we report some broad facts concerning trade, FDI, relative wages, income, education and child labour in developing countries. In Section 3, we graft a family decision model on to a two-period model of the world economy incorporating the insights of recent trade theory. In Section 4, we bring the theory to the data. Section 5 concludes.
Stylized facts
The …gures and tables referred to in this section are constructed using country data drawn from ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNIDO, World Bank and the Barro and Lee dataset (detailed variable de…nitions and data sources can be found in Appendix 2). Figure 1 plots the child labour rate against the share of schoolage children not enrolled at school. The correlation is positive but low. As pointed out by Cigno and Rosati (2002, 2005) among others, the correlation is low because many of the children enrolled at school in developing countries work at the same time. Further considering that, as stressed in Cigno (2012) , school enrolment is not synonymous of school attendance, and school attendance is not synonymous of study e¤ort (because working children have little time for rest and to do their home work, tend to be absent from school and are too sleepy and tired to take full advantage of school attendance when they do attend), it then follows that child labour rather than non enrollment is the best inverse proxy for e¤ective educational investment.
Figure 2 plots child labour against the log of per-capita GDP. It also shows the child labour rate predicted by a Generalized Linear Model regression with a binomial distribution and a logit link function (see Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) . By construction, this model takes into account the nonlinearities arising from the fact that the dependent variable is constrained between 0 and 1. The correlation is negative but small, suggesting the presence of other important co-variates. As Table 1 shows, the marginal e¤ect of per-capita GDP is clearly decreasing. For low-income economies (those with per-capita GDP below 1,000 dollars a year), a 1% increase in per-capita GDP is associated with a 10% reduction in child labour. For lower to middle income economies (those with per-capita GDP between 1000 and 4000 dollars), the marginal e¤ect is less than half that estimated for poorer economies. For upper-middle income economies (those with per-capita GDP above 4000 dollars), the reduction is less than 4%, falling to about 2% for higher income countries. With reference to our introductory discussion about di¤erent ways of explaining child labour, it would thus appear that explanations based on income are important for very poor countries, where a large share of the population is close to the subsistence level (and the government's ability to remedy this by taxing and redistributing is severely limited), but other factors are more important in less poor countries. Figure 3 plots child labour against a measure of trade openness (imports plus exports over GDP) lagged …ve years to allow for the e¤ects of trade changes to work their way through the economy. The size of the dots refers to the country's skill endowment (measured as the average numbers of years at school of the population over the age of 25) again lagged …ve years. Like the correlation between child labour and income, the correlation between child labour and trade exposure is negative but low. If we focus on the larger dots, however, we get the impression that the correlation is higher in countries that started out with a large skill endowment than in countries that started out with a low one. It would thus seem that not only income, but also trade and skill endowments, have a bene…cial e¤ect on child labour. The literature suggests that foreign direct investment also may have a role. Over the past two decades, developing countries have indeed increased their ability to attract such investment. By 2013, these countries accounted for over a half of the FDI total (WIR, 2014) , and even those, like Africa, that in earlier decades had remained on the sidelines of the globalization game, have recently started to take an active part. There is, however, no obvious correlation between this variable and child labour The next section will help us to formulate testable hypotheses.
Theoretical analysis
Consider a two-period, two-country model of the world economy. In each period t = 1; 2, each country i = N; S (where N stands for North and S for South) is populated by a measure one of families. In period 1, each family consists of a working-age mother and her school-age son. The mother is endowed with one unit of time, and the child with units of adult-equivalent time (0 < < 1). In period 2, each family consists of a working-age adult (the now grown-up son) endowed with one unit of time. A family is said to be of type H if the adult member is skilled, of type L if he or she is unskilled. We denote by a t the share of skilled adults, and by 1 a t the share of unskilled adults, in the South's adult population in period t (0 < a t < 1). In period 1, each Southern mother spends a fraction of her time endowment looking after her son (0 < < 1), and supplies the rest inelastically to the labour market. In the same period, her son spends a fraction e of his adult-equivalent time endowment studying, and 1 e working (0 e _ e, with _ e < 1). The amount of time e that a child spends studying in period 1 determines the probability that he will be a skilled worker in period 2. In the North, e is constrained to be equal to _ e. (compulsory education). In period 2, each adult (no matter whether Northern or Southern) supplies his entire time endowment inelastically to the labour market.
There are two intermediate goods, x 1 and x 2 , and three …nal goods, A, B and C. A is costlessly assembled from x 1 and x 2 . B, C, x 1 and x 2 are produced using skilled and unskilled labour. We assume that B and C are non tradable. While B is produced and consumed only in the South, C is produced and consumed only in the North.
2 Of the intermediate goods, x 1 can be produced in either part of the world, but x 2 can be produced only in the North.
3 Trade barriers are prohibitively high in period 1, but it is common knowledge that these barriers will come down in period 2. This implies that, in period 1, the South can produce and consume only good B; because the production of good A would require an input of the intermediate good x 2 , that cannot be imported from the North. By contrast, the North produces and consumes both A and C: In period 2, when trade opens, the South can start its production of A by importing x 2 from the North and paying for it by exporting part of its production of x 1 . The North may continue to produce x 1 or relocate its production to the South.
Let q ti denote the wage rate accruing to skilled labour, and w ti the one accruing to unskilled labour, in country i in period t . Preferences, technology and relative factor endowments are assumed to be such that q tS w tS > q tN w tN ; t = 1; 2:
Put another way, we call North the country where skilled labour is so abundant, in period 1, that no matter how much the other country, called South, invests in its children's education in the course of period 1, it cannot catch up with the North by period 2. We further assume that there is no migration in either period.
In period 1, agents correctly anticipate period-2 prices and wages. Given this assumption, the equilibrium could be found in one shot (no backwardinduction problem). For ease of exposition, however, we …rst look for the period-2 equilibrium taking period-1 decisions as parameters, and then solve for period-1 decisions. As child labour is concentrated mostly in developing countries, we focus on the South.
Period 2
The period-2 set-up builds on the theoretical insights of Tang and Wood (2000), Wood (2002) and Zhu and Tre ‡er (2005) . In Tang and Wood and Zhu and Tre ‡er, however, the objective of the analysis is to examine, respectively, the e¤ect of a reduction in the cost of cooperation and of the South's catching-up on wage inequality in both parts of the world. Here, by contrast, our aim is to establish the e¤ect of period-2 cross-country trade and investment liberalization on the period-2 skill premium, because that will a¤ect period-1 education and child labour decisions. As the analytical techniques used in this subsection are well established in the literature, we concentrate on the economic interpretation, and refer the reader to textbook expositions of the Hecksher-Ohlin model for technical details.
Production
In this period, the South can import x 2 from the North. This gives the former the opportunity of domestically producing the intermediate good x 1 by the constant-returns-to-scale technology
and then costlessly assembling the …nal good A from x 1 and x 2 according the constant-returns-to-scale technology
The North may now choose to import x 1 from the South instead of producing it. The period-2 cost-minimizing quantities of skilled and unskilled labour employed in country S to produce a unit of x 1 are, respectively,
and
The minimized period-2 unit cost of producing x 1 in country S is consequently
Denoting by c 1N the period-2 unit cost of producing x 1 in country N , and recalling that (1), we can realistically assume c 1N > c 1S ; 6 and thus that x 1 will be produced only in country S. We may interpret this as saying that the North's x 1 producers relocate their factories in the South. 4 As x 1 will be produced only in the South, and x 2 can be produced only in the North, we will then write, dispensing with country subscripts,
where c 2 denotes the minimized period-2 unit cost of x 2 . 5 The period-2 unit cost of A is
Good B is produced by the constant-returns-to-scale technology,
where H B denotes the quantity of skilled labour, and L B the quantity of unskilled labour, employed in this activity. The cost-minimizing inputs of skilled and unskilled labour per unit of output are, respectively,
The period-2 unit cost of B will thus be
Similar expressions may be derived for the quantities of goods A and C produced by the North. 4 In Tang and Wood (2000) , this is induced by a fall in co-operation cost that makes it advantageous to transfer entrepreneurs, designers, engineers and other professionals from the North to the South. In Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , o¤shoring is made pro…table by the fall in in the cost of production of the South relative to that of the North. This fall is explained by capital ‡ows lowering the interest rate in the South relative to the North. In Zhu and Te ‡er (2005) it is the Southern catch up that makes pro…table relocating the production of some goods from the North to the South. All these arguments could be applied also to our model. For simplicity, however, we have directly assumed that trade liberalization makes it possible and advantageous for the North to import x 1 from the South. 5 As we have not modelled the production of x 2 , we do not have a cost function for it. We will thus treat c 2 as a parameter.
6 Similar expressions may be derived also for the North for goods A and C: .
Consumption
In the South, the average family (recall that families are di¤erentiated by skill level) solves
where U S2 is the son's utility, and
the average period-2 income. Using the …rst-order conditions, we can derive the South's period-2 average demands for the two …nal goods,
and for the two intermediate goods,
The average Northern family's optimization problem is
where U N 2 is the son's utility, and, Y N 2 the average period-2 income. Therefore, the North's demands are
Using the balance-of-trade equilibrium condition
and substituting from (11) and (14), we then …nd
Equilibrium
For the zero-pro…t condition, prices will be equal to unit costs. Therefore,
Equilibrium in the South's labour markets further requires
As A N 2 is determined by the North's market equilibrium conditions and thus a parameter, we have then four non-linear equations in four unknowns, A S2 , B 2 , q 2S and w 2S
7
We now make the following standard assumption.
, either
or
Given NFIR, and noting that x 2 c 2 = (1 )P A2 , (17) (18) implies a two-way relationship between
Substituting from (23) into (13), and then into (19) (20), we obtain due equations in the two unknowns, q 2S and w 2S . Straightforward computation gives us the period-2 skill premium,
, as a function of of the period-2 labour 7 Similar equations determine A N 2 , C 2 , q 2N and w 2N .
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force skill composition, a 2 , and of the technological and preference parameters, and ,
The function G (:) will di¤er according to whether (21) or (22) holds true. Denoting the …rst case by the superscript U , and the second by the superscript D, it can be easily shown that, for any (a 2; ; ),
If trade barriers did not come down in period 2, the South would continue to produce only good B as in period 1. Since, by Assumption 1,
is either lower or higher than
, it then follows that, if the economy were to remain closed in period 2, the period-2 equilibrium skill premium would fall between G U (a 2; ; ) and G D (a 2; ; ): Denoting the closed economy case by the superscript M; we can then write
Period 1
Having obtained
as a function of a 2 under the assumption that the economy is open in period 2, we shall now go on to determine e and thus a 2 under this assumption, and under the competing assumption that the economy is closed not only in period 1, but also in period 2.
Consumption and education
In the current period, mothers inelastically supply all the time left over from child care to the labour market. To avoid carrying too many constants around, we set = = 1 2 . Recall that sons spend a fraction e of their time endowment (measured in adult-equivalent units) studying, and a fraction 1 e working. 8 A child spending e units of time studying in period 1 has a probability (e) of becoming a skilled adult worker in period 2.
9 For simplicity, we assume (e) = e:
As child labour is obviously unskilled, and having assumed that it is perfectly substitutable for unskilled adult labour at the rate = 1 2 , the opportunity-cost of education per unit of adult-equivalent time is w S1 . We do not consider other educational costs.
Recall that a fraction a 1 of Southern mothers is skilled, and a fraction 1 a 1 unskilled. Let P B1 denote the price of good B in period 1. Given P B1 , q 1S , w 1S , q 2S and w 2S , a type-j family (j = H; L) solves
where U j S1 is the mother's utility function, and
with probability e j k = w 2S with probability 1 e j :
The dependence of U j S1 on k re ‡ects an altruistic interest in the child's future earning capacity and thus consumption.
At an interior solution,
Therefore, the South's aggregate period-1 demands for goods and education are, respectively,
There are also two possible corner solutions, one with e j = 0 and the other with e j = _ e. For w 1S su¢ ciently low, the …rst one may realistically apply to type-L mothers, whose income would then be R L = w 1S . That is interesting because, in such a case, a su¢ ciently large increase in income would raise the demand for education, and reduce the supply of child labour, as theorized by Ranjan (2001) , and exempli…ed by our Table 1 and Figure 2 .
In what remains of this section, we will focus on the case where both family types are at an interior point.
Equilibrium
As we saw in the last subsection, the cost-minimizing inputs of skilled and unskilled labour per unit of B are, respectively,
Thus, perfect competition requires
labour market equilibrium requires
and goods market equilibrium requires
The period-1 equilibrium skill premium is determined by period-1 relative labour endowments. Using (30) (31), we …nd
Hence, solving for
Substituting from (29) and (34), we obtain
; m 2 fU; M; Dg
Proposition 2 There exists a unique equilibrium relationship a
Recalling that a 2 = e, the …rst part of this proposition tells us that the higher is the South's skill endowment, the less will parents in the South invest in their children's education. That is because, for any given expectation of q2 w2 , the more skill-abundant the South is (in period 1, when it is still a closed economy), the lower will q1 w1 be. Given that, in view of (27) (28), the amount H-type parents invest in their children's education is increasing in q1 w1 , and the amount L-type parents invest is independent of it, aggregate educational investment is then decreasing in a 1 The second part of the proposition tells us that foreign trade and investment may reduce child labour. The reason, in this case, is that foreign trade and investment may raise q2 w2 , and thus increase the incentive for parents in the South to invest in their children's education.
Testable implications
The analysis so far has assumed that the South is a homogeneous entity. In reality, the South consists of di¤erent countries, all skill-poor compared with the North, but some more than others.
10 Suppose that the intermediate good x 1 (tradable in period 2) can be produced by a continuum of technologies indexed 0 < z < 1: Given q2 w2 , each unit of the good produced with technology z will employ h(z) units of skilled labour, and l(z) units of unskilled labour. Arrange inputs so that h(z) l(z) is increasing in z: Let C(z) be the unit cost of producing a good of skill-intensity z. For any q2 w2 > 1, C(z) is increasing and continuous in z: Suppose there is one developed country labelled N , and two developing countries labelled S 1 and S 2 , such that S 2 has the lowest and N the highest relative skill endowment. Then,
In Figure 6 , adapted from a diagram in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , the straight lines C N , C S1 and C S2 are the graphs of the cost function C(:) for, respectively, N , S 1 and S 2 . For z < Z 1 , C S2 lies below both C N and C S1 . For z > Z 2 , C S2 lies above both C N and C S1 . For intermediate values of z, C S1 1 0 The converse applies to the North, but this is of no consequence for the present argument.
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lies below both C S2 and C N . The two cut-o¤ points are implicitly de…ned by, respectively,
The diagram tells us that trade liberalization will make it advantageous for the North to relocate the production of intermediate goods with skill intensity Z 1 < z < Z 2 to country S 1 , and the production of intermediate goods with skill intensity 0 < z < Z 1 to country S 2 . In general, therefore, the better endowed with skilled labour a developing country is when it opens itself up to foreign trade and investment, the more skill-intensive will the production activities relocated to that country be,
Taken together with the foregoing proposition, (36) implies that the better endowed with skilled labour a developing country is before liberalization, the higher will its skill premium and the lower its decreasing in the income of lowskill families. These are testable propositions. In view of Proposition 1, another testable proposition is that, if the low-skill wage rate is su¢ ciently low, the child labour rate is decreasing in the income of low-income families, and in the share of these families in the total population.
Empirical analysis
In this section, we test our theoretical predictions using two di¤erent datasets (see Appendix 2 for precise variable de…nitions and data sources). The …rst dataset was constructed merging the WDI (World Bank) and UNESCO databases, which provide comparable information on trade, FDI and various measures of the skill endowment, with the Industrial Statistics Database of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which provides annual information on the manufacturing sector disaggregated at the 2-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classi…cation (ISIC) revision 2 for the 1963-2008 period. The second dataset was constructed matching and merging the data on child labour, trade, FDI and skill endowment provided by UNICEF, UNESCO, World Bank, ILO, and Barro-Lee. To get a measure of the skill premium for each UNIDO country in each year, we divided the average wage rate in industries classi…ed by the OECD as "high or medium-high technology" by the average wage rate in industries classi…ed as "low technology". Child labour is measured as the percentage of children in the 5-14 age range recorded as working. Trade exposure (open) is measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. The skill endowments are alternatively measured by the share of individuals with primary education only (edu_pri) and the share of individuals with secondary or higher education (edu_sec), by the primary education survival rate to the …nal grade of primary education (edupri_sur) or by the average number of years in education of the population aged 25 or more.
Given that, according to our theoretical analysis, the child labour e¤ects of exposing a country to foreign trade come through induced skill-premium and income changes, child labour, income and the skill premium should be estimated simultaneously. As we do not have a dataset containing both child labour and the skill premium, however, we had little choice but to separately estimate an equation for each of these variables. We did not estimate an income equation, but included the log 11 of real per capita GDP (lnGDP_pc) in the list of righthand-side variables common to both equations. Being aware that income is potentially endogenous, we tried instrumenting it with its lagged value, which is highly correlated with the explanatory variable itself but uncorrelated with the error term. In both the skill premium and the child labour equations, our measures of trade openness and skill endowments are lagged …ve years because it takes time for trade exposure to fully deploy its e¤ects (at the given initial skill endowments). The explanatory variables thus include L5open and, alternatively, L5edu_pri and L5edu_sec, L5edupri_sur or L5edu_years. We also tried to interact the lagged trade measure with the lagged skill endowment measure or measures. As an additional control, we alternatively tried the Chinn-Ito index of foreign investment openness (kaopen) or actual net inward foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP (fdi_perc). We would have liked to control also for the skill content of such investment, bur we do not have country-level data on it. The year when the (…nal) level of the skill premium and of the share of working children are recorded may vary from country to country (usually between 2007 and 2012). Year dummies take care of that. The descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 highlight the disparity between the number of observations available for the skill premium and the number available for child labour, and thus the di¤erence between the size of the sample used to estimate the former and the size of the sample used to estimate the latter. Table 4 reports two alternative OLS estimates of the skill-premium equation. The explanatory variables are those already mentioned, plus the lagged tradelagged skill endowments interaction terms. As the dataset is assembled from di¤erent surveys concerning di¤erent years, we could only carry out cross-section estimates. In the …rst regression, L5edu_pri and L5edu_sec a¤ect the skill premium negatively and signi…cantly, but their interaction with L5open a¤ects the said premium positively and signi…cantly. Notice that the coe¢ cient of the stock of workers educated to primary school level and no further is very similar to (actually slightly larger and more signi…cant than) the one of workers with secondary or higher education. This suggests that what matters most for present purposes (i.e., given the way the skill premium is measured) is the number of workers educated at least to primary school level. As the second regression shows, dropping L5edu_sec and L5edu_sec X L5_open would in fact increase the size and signi…cance of the constant term at the expense of L5edu_prim and L5edu_prim X L5_open. Rather than adding together L5edu_prim and L5edu_sec to get the share of adults educated at least to primary level, we preferred to keep the two skill endowments separate, and thus to use the more precise estimates obtained with the …rst regression.
According to these estimates, the e¤ect of a small change in trade openness on the skill premium …ve years hence is equal to 7:421 + 9:708L5edu_pri + 9:146L5edu_sec. Therefore, the e¤ect will be nonnegative if and only if the country's initial skill endowments satisfy 9:708L5edu_pri + 9:146L5edu_ sec 7:421:
Where this condition is not satis…ed, trade exposure will reduce the skill premium. For a poor developing country where hardly anybody has secondary or higher education, (37) means that trade liberalization will raise the skill premium only if more than three quarters of the adult population completed primary education. Not all OECD countries satisfy (37), and not all non-OECD countries violate it. Consistently with the theoretical prediction that the skill premium is a¤ected by the (endogenously determined) FDI skill content, rather than by its actual or potential volume, neither fdi_perc nor kaopen are significant. Income is never signi…cant, and instrumenting it with its lagged value makes no qualitative di¤erence to the estimates.
12 Table 3 shows OLS and IV estimates of the child labour equation. The number of observations is relatively small. For most of the 108 countries with child labour data, we can construct L5edu_pri, but not L5edu_sec because many of these countries do not have secondary education statistics. We thus use the lagged value of the most widely available statistic, namely the survival rate to the …nal year of primary education again lagged …ve years (L5edu_prisurv). Nothing of substance changes if we use L5edu_pri or L5edu_years instead. The sample gets even smaller if we introduce kaopen or fdi_perc. These data limitations prevented us from interacting trade with skill endowments. Irrespective of whether income is taken to be exogenous or instrumented with its lagged value, and provided that we do not control for the potential FDI ‡ow (kaopen), child labour turns out to be negatively and signi…cantly a¤ected by per-capita income, lagged skill endowments and lagged trade openness.
13 While kaopen is not signi…cant, fdi_perc is signi…cantly negative, but introducing either of these variables takes signi…cance away from ln_GDPpc. With a bounded dependent variable such as child labour, it would be better to use a Generalized Linear Model with a binomial distribution and a logit link function as in Section 2. The results obtained by this approach, shown in Table 5 , are remarkably similar to those obtained using the other two methods, but give us the additional information that the best model (the one with the lower values of the model selection statistics, AIC and BIC) has neither kaopen nor fdi as an explanatory variable. This con…rms our earlier remark that what matters is neither the actual nor the potential size of foreign direct investment, but rather the endogenously determined skill content of this investment.
Where countries with skill endowments satisfying (37) are concerned, the …nding that trade exposure reduces child labour (see Table 3 ) is consistent with the …nding that trade raises the skill premium (see Table 4 ). What about the …nding that trade reduces child labour not only in these countries, but also in those where it lowers the skill premium? Assuming that trade enhances productivity, because it expands the production possibility set and limits policyinduced distortions, we may explain this by saying that, in the presence of trade, the skill endowment variable picks up the child labour reducing e¤ect of trade-induced per-capita income changes. Having estimated (see Table 1 ) that income reduces child labour, and explained this by saying (see Section 3) that income relaxes the credit constraint on educational investment, and given that the share of credit-constrained households will be larger (for any given level of per-capita income) in countries where the share of educated adults is smaller than in countries where this share is larger, it is in fact arguable that, in countries that liberalized when their skill endowments did not satisfy (37), the child labour reducing e¤ect of the induced income increase more than o¤set the child labour raising e¤ect of the induced skill premium reduction. Elsewhere, the two e¤ects have the same sign, and child labour will have consequently fallen more sharply for any given degree of trade openness.
Take for example Brazil. In 2007, this country's trade ratio was 1.217, and its skill endowments were such that the estimated marginal e¤ect of trade on the 2012 skill premium was negative (-0.632). Between 2007 and 2012, the skill premium did in fact fall slightly (-0.05 per cent), but real per-capita GDP rose su¢ ciently (+13.5 per cent) for the share of children in the 5-14 age range recorded as working to fall by 2.5 percentage points nevertheless. Similarly, in 2005, Iran had a trade ratio of 1.008, and skill endowments such that the estimated marginal e¤ect of trade on the 2010 skill premium was again negative (-0.481) . Between 2005 and 2010, Iran's skill premium fell (-0.25 per cent), but its real per-capita GDP rose so strongly (+17.8 per cent) that the share of children in work fell by 3 percentage points. As an example of a developing country where trade exposure raised the skill premium take Costa Rica. In 2006, this country's trade ratio was 0.655, and its skill endowments were such that the estimated marginal e¤ect of trade exposure was positive (+0.218). Between 2006 and 2011, not only the skill premium but also real per-capita income rose, and the combined e¤ect of these two changes was to reduce the share of working children by a very substantial amount (23 percentage points).
Discussion and conclusion
Our Feenstra-Hanson and Zhu-Tre ‡er inspired theoretical analysis, emphasizing trade in intermediates and technology transfer via o¤shoring theoretical analysis predicts that (a) child labour is decreasing in both the skill premium (because this premium constitutes an incentive for parents to invest in their children's education) and parental income (because income relaxes the credit constraint on educational investment), and (b) the better endowed with skilled labour a developing country is when it opens itself up to trade, the more likely it is that its skill premium will rise. Assuming that trade raises average income (because it enlarges the production set and reduces policy-induced distortions), the child labour rate will then de…nitely fall in countries where trade raises the skill premium, but it may fall also in countries where trade lowers the skill premium because, in those countries, the share of credit-constrained households is larger, and the e¤ect of the induced income change consequently stronger. These predictions are not rejected by the data.
The empirical analysis shows that liberalization raises the skill premium in countries that started out with a su¢ ciently large stock of educated workers, and reduces it elsewhere, but child labour everywhere it was present before the liberalization. In this perspective, liberalization is thus bene…cial for all countries. But it is more bene…cial in countries that started out with a su¢ ciently large endowment of skilled labour, where the e¤ect of the induced income increase is compounded by that of the induced skill premium increase, than in other countries, where the two e¤ects have opposite signs. In a broader perspective, liberalization creates a divide between developing countries that, having started out on the right foot, will specialize in low-skill production activities less than they did before and will eventually become developed countries, and developing countries that, having started out on the wrong foot, will specialize even further in low-skill activities.
For the second group of countries, our analysis yields qualitatively the same results as traditional Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theory. For the …rst group of countries, by contrast, our results are the opposite of those of traditional trade theory. Looking back to a period preceding the one included the present empirical analysis, the …rst group of countries would seem to include the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) who, in the course of the 1960s and 1970s, invested massively in education before liberalizing in both the economic and the political sense. This allowed Hong Kong and Singapore to become major exporters of …nancial services, and South Korea and Taiwan of IT goods. Their example was followed some years later by the so-called Tiger Cub Economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). Tigers and their cubs are now classi…ed as emerging or newly industrialized countries. Now let H(a 2 ) = 2 a 1 a 2 ; H 0 a2 (a 2 ) < 0 and K m (a 2 ) = 1 ln G m (a 2 ; ; )
; K 0m (a 2 ) > 0:
For 0 < a 2 < 1, 1 a 1 < H(a 2 ) < 2a 1 and 0 < K m (a 2 ) < 1:
From monotonicity, K m (a 2 ) can cross H(a 2 ) only once, and this will surely happen since K m ! 1 as a 2 ! 1. Noting that K 0U < K D 8a 2 , the result a Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
